

Policy brief: New behavioural insights;
Estimation results for selected case studies

Nathalie Picard, THEMA, UCP




General methodology for analyzing behavioral insights, and Outline of the talk

- ▶ **General overview of nested decisions**
 - ▶ Forward looking (anticipates lower level choices), conditional on upper level choices
 - ▶ One decision maker (singles/one-worker HH/unitary model)
 - ▶ Collective decision: multiple decision makers within HH
- ▶ **Development and estimation of models relevant given available data and economic considerations**
 - ▶ No restriction on the possibility to implement them in UrbanSim
- ▶ **Implementation of these models in UrbanSim**
 - ▶ Evolving UrbanSim to meet requirements of models
 - ▶ Evolving models to meet simulation constraints
- ▶ **Selection of specific models focusing on specific parts of the nested decisions in Paris case study**
 1. Joint residential location-job location-job type
 2. Borrowing constraints and nested tenure status/dwelling type/HH location
 3. Collective decision-making within household (residential location)
- ▶ **Conclusion, ongoing and future developments**



Full decision tree, individual level, residential location before workplace




Model 1: Residential location, job location, job type & individual-specific accessibility

Ignacio Inoa, Nathalie Picard, André de Palma,
forthcoming in *Mathematical Population Studies*



Decisions selected from the full tree



Because many jobs suited for them
 Because "close" to many jobs suited for them
 Because attractive to educated people
 Because attractive to educated people


Potential job location 1
 Potential job location 2
 attractive to low educated men
 attractive to low educated people

Model: Maximization of the utility

$$\begin{aligned}U_n(l, k, j, i) &= U_n^T(l, k) + U_n^W(j) + U_n^R(i) - C_n^{WR}(j, i) \\ &= V_n^T(k) + \varepsilon_n^0(l) + \varepsilon_n^1(k) + V_n^W(j) + \varepsilon_n^2(j) \\ &\quad + V_n^R(i) + \varepsilon_n^3(i) - C_n^{WR}(j, i) \\ &\quad \forall (l, k, j, i) \in \mathcal{E}_n\end{aligned}$$

where:

- ▶ $U_n^T(l, k)$: utility specific to job l of type k
- ▶ $U_n^W(j)$: utility specific to (job) location j
- ▶ $U_n^R(i)$: utility of living in (residential) location i
- ▶ $C_n^{WR}(j, i)$: generalized commuting cost between residential location i and workplace j
- ▶ The choices of i and j are de facto related through the generalized commuting cost $C_n^{WR}(j, i)$ and cannot be assumed independent.



Moving up the decision tree

- ▶ Individual-specific attractiveness of workplace j

$$S_n(j) = \mu_n^1 \ln \left(\sum_{k'=1, \dots, K; N_{k'j} > 0}^K \exp(\delta_n^1 + \delta_n^0 \ln(N_{k'j})) \right)$$

→ more efficient than the usual total #jobs N_j for explaining workplace choice, especially for higher education levels

- ▶ Individual-specific accessibility to jobs from residential location i



$$LS_n(i) = \mu_n^2 \ln \left(\sum_{j' \in J_i} \exp \left(\frac{V_n^W(j'; X_n, Z_{j'}) - C_n^{WR}(j', i) + S_n(j')}{\mu_n^2} \right) \right)$$

→ more efficient than the usual accessibility measure for explaining residential location, especially for higher education levels




Attractiveness measure by education

Elementary & Middle School Education
Job Type Attractiveness




Attractiveness measure by education

High School Education
Job Type Attractiveness




Attractiveness measure by education

Undergraduate Education
Job Type Attractiveness




Attractiveness measure by education

Graduate Education
Job Type Attractiveness




Accessibility measure by gender

Women
Residential Location Accessibility




Accessibility measure by gender




Accessibility measure by education

Elementary & Middle School Education *Residential Location Accessibility*




Accessibility measure by education

High School Education
Residential Location Accessibility





Accessibility measure by education

Undergraduate Education
Residential Location Accessibility



Accessibility measure by education

Graduate Education
Residential Location Accessibility




Model 2: Tenure status, dwelling type, residential location & borrowing constraints

Sophie Dantan and Nathalie Picard,
Part of Sophie's PhD dissertation, to be defended in 2013


Decisions selected from the full tree

Not a decision; unobserved typology


→ latent model



Distribution of the probability to be constrained for Poor/Medium/Rich



Proportion of constrained households, by commune



Proportion of constrained households

0.248559 - 0.600000

0.600001 - 0.700000

0.700001 - 0.911933

Computing the effect of borrowing constraint on location choice

- ▶ Probability of tenure status $s=o,r$, dwelling type $d=h,f$ and location j , for HH n

- ▶ With constraint

$$P_n(o, d, j) = P_n(u) \square P_n(o | u) \square P_n(d | o) \square P_n(j | o, d)$$

$$P_n(r, d, j) = P_n(u) \square P_n(r | u) \square P_n(d | r) \square P_n(j | r, d)$$

$$+ P_n(c) \square \underbrace{P_n(d | r) \square P_n(j | r, d)}_1$$

- ▶ Without constraint


$$P_n(s, d, j) = P_n(s) \square P_n(d | s) \square P_n(j | s, d)$$

$P_n(h | o) > P_n(h | r)$ and $P_n(j | o, d) > P_n(j | r, d)$ in far away suburbs

- ▶ ➔ shift from flats to houses & from CBD to far away suburbs



Differential in demand if there were no borrowing constraints



No equilibrium effect
→ Normative,
not predictive



Model 3: Couple Residential location and spouses workplaces

Pierre-André Chiappori, André de Palma, Ignacio Inoa,
Nathalie Picard

Motivation and objectives

- ▶ Understand and predict couples location choices
- ▶ Role of local amenities and spouses workplaces (commuting time, commuting cost)
- ▶ Pareto-optimality of residential location
- ▶ Respective weights of spouses in negotiation process
- ▶ Disentangle bargaining powers from values of time
- ▶ Measure the specific influence of each explanatory variable on bargaining powers and on values of time



Spouses' utility functions

- ▶ Dwelling characteristics and local amenities Z
- ▶ Dwelling price (per m²) P
- ▶ Cost of commuting time t^g : function of individual-specific value of time
- ▶ Daily consumption of private d^g and public good d^c
- ▶ Additively separable utilities:

$$U^g = \underbrace{V^g(P, Z)}_{\substack{\text{HH location=} \\ \text{Long term decision}}} - \underbrace{c^g(t^g)}_{\substack{\text{Commuting cost also} \\ \text{depends on workplace,} \\ \text{which is subject to} \\ \text{random shocks}}} + \underbrace{\phi^g(d^g, d^c)}_{\substack{\text{Daily consumption=} \\ \text{Short term decision}}, g = m, f$$



No reliable intertemporal commitment

One Pareto weight for each part: μ_1, μ_2, μ_3

A partially optimal household location would then maximize:

$$\underbrace{V(P,Z)}_{\substack{\mu_1, V^m, V^f \text{ cannot be disentangled} \\ \rightarrow V(P,Z) \text{ altogether}}} - (1 - \mu) c^m(t^m) - \mu c^f(t^f)$$

μ_1, V^m, V^f cannot be disentangled
 $\rightarrow V(P,Z)$ altogether

Pareto weight specific to
 each decision

Unobserved, easy to optimize daily
 \rightarrow omitted

Household location choice: select location j which maximizes

$$V(P_j, Z_j) - (1 - \mu)c^m(t_j^m) - \mu c^f(t_j^f)$$




Econometric specification and minimum distance estimator

- ▶ Quadratic specification of commuting costs $c^g(t^g)$ with individual-specific time preferences
- ▶ Linear specification on Pareto weight


$$\begin{aligned} & \sum_k v_k (y^c, X^c, X^m, X^f) Z_{k,j} - v_P (y^c) \ln P_j \\ & - \left[1/2 - \sum_k (\mu_k^f X_k^f - \mu_k^m X_k^m) - \sum_l \mu_l^c X_l^c \right] \cdot \\ & \left[\{a_0^m + \sum_k a_k^m X_k^m + \sum_l a_l^m X_l^c\} t^m + \{b_0^m + \sum_k b_k^m X_k^m + \sum_l b_l^m X_l^c\} (t^m)^2 \right] \\ & - \left[1/2 + \sum_k (-\mu_k^m X_k^m + \mu_k^f X_k^f) + \sum_l \mu_l^c X_l^c \right] \cdot \\ & \left[\{a_0^f + \sum_k a_k^f X_k^f + \sum_l a_l^f X_l^c\} t^f + \{b_0^f + \sum_k b_k^f X_k^f + \sum_l b_l^f X_l^c\} (t^f)^2 \right] + \epsilon_j \end{aligned}$$

- ▶ Imposes restrictions on coefficients in MNL model
- ▶ → direct estimation is by far too cumbersome
- ▶ → minimum distance estimator
 - ▶ From reduced form parameters to structural parameters
 - ▶ Test Pareto-optimality of residential location
 - ▶ Correct the bias in estimated values of time




Correcting biases in VOT

Figure 1: Magnitude of bias in VOT (40 years old)




Correcting biases in VOT

Figure 2: Magnitude of bias in VOT (20 years old)



Future



Ongoing and future developements planned in Paris case study, **incl. theoretical developments**

- ▶ Integration of demographic module
 - ▶ Endogenous HH formation and evolution
- ▶ **Dynamics of location choices**
- ▶ Nested choices of tenure status, dwelling type, residential and job location
- ▶ Capacity constraints
- ▶ Borrowing constraints
- ▶ **Explicit modelling of affordable housing**
 - ▶ Strong capacity constraints
- ▶ Computation of indicators to measure
 - ▶ inequalities, social mixity and household welfare



Future developments in Paris case study

- ▶ **Modeling interactions within households**
 - ▶ Joint modeling of residential and professional location
 - ▶ Individual-specific travel time to actual job or accessibility to potential jobs
 - ▶ Collective decisions: diverging preferences and constraints for location, and bargaining power
- ▶ **Match between labor supply and demand**
 - ▶ Worker chooses workplace depending on actual home-job travel time
 - ▶ Improved OD matrix beyond 4-step model
 - ▶ Aggregate demand by establishment
 - ▶ Better models and predicts aggregation of jobs
 - ▶ agglomeration effects
 - ▶ Explicit modeling of stakeholders
- ▶ **Interactions with or integration of a CGE model**

